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In 1959, Fidel Castro rose to power in Cuba after overthrowing dictator Fulgencio 
Batista. Castro and his revolutionary group, the 26th of July Movement, were viewed with 
suspicion by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration, and by the end of the 
year, Castro's regime presented a grave problem to the outgoing president due to the far left-
leaning politics of the group. The fear of Communism spreading throughout the \Vestern 
Hemisphere in the relatively early stages of the Cold War was prevalent in American politics 
throughout the 1950s, and preventing such a fear from becoming a reality was a top priority. 
The possibility of a communist government only ninety miles away from the United States 
mainland did not sit well with Eisenhower or any other top national security official. The 
officials were well aware of the ramifications of Cuba becoming a strategic puppet for the Soviet 
Union, and they were willing to entertain any ideas to neutralize Castro and his regime. One 
such concept included President Dwight David Eisenhower authorizing the Central Intelligence 
Agency to plot the overthrow of the Cuban government. However, throughout the planning 
stage of the mission, the misinformation provided by the CIA to Presidents Eisenhower andJohn 
F. Kennedy, as well as Kennedy's own p<XJr decisions in the weeks leading up to the invasion, 
ultimately d<XJmed its chances for success. 
The reason the Central Intelligence Agency was chosen by President Eisenhower to 
execute the removal of Castro stemmed from two factors. First, the mission statement of the 
Agency is not only to provide intelligence, but also be able to "perform certain other functions as 
directed by the National Security Council."' The second, and probably most important factor, 
was the Agency's success in a prior operation during the Eisenhower presidency. 
In 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency was able to accomplish the toppling of the left-
leaning Guatemalan government led by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The Eisenhower 
Administration proceeded with action after claiming the shipment of C:r~ch and German arms to 
Guatemala violated the 130-year-old Monroe Doctrine. The CIA not only started a campaign of 
bombing strategic locations in Guatemala, but also an intense psychological operation of 
jamming radio frequencies to confuse and incite the officers in Guatemala's army into leading a 
revolt.2 
\Vhile the CIA would base their operation in Cuba on the Guatemalan plan, a 
revolutionary in Guatemala would learn from the failure he encountered and apply the new 
knowledge seven years later in Cuba. Indeed, through Che Guevara's experience in Guatemala, 
he became Fidel Castro's right hand man in suppressing the invasion at the Bay ofPigs.3 
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Four years after overthrowing the leftist Guatemalan government, the spread of 
Communism once again worried Eisenhower, this time in Cuba. President Fulgencio Batista had 
lost the respect of his people, and Castro's guerilla movement experienced growing popular 
support. Onjanuary I, 1959, Fidel Castro became the leader of Cuba. Once firmly in power, 
Castro proclaimed the revolutionary ideals of free speech, free elections, privatization of the 
economy and so forth. However, such ideals never became reality. He made his proclamations 
to buy time to create ties with Communist nations, particularly the Soviet Union. 
The truth behind the revolutionary ideals, however, is something entirely different. After 
installing Communists into his cabinet and internal police force, Castro executed hundreds of 
anti-revolution supporters without due process. He promised free elections within eighteen 
months to allow for political parties to reorganize, but that time frame was pushed back to two 
years and then four. Also, within the first two years of control, Fidel Castro nationalized both 
Cuban and American private businesses. 
Unfortunately, the State Department initially had become smitten with the charming, yet 
enigmatic leader of Cuba. When his revolutionary movement against Batista began, Castro 
befriended Herbert Matthews, a reporter for the influential New rork Times. Matthews' glowing 
articles on the guerilla leader generated public sympathy for Castro's cause. When Fidel Castro 
came to power, the same charm worked on Roy Rubottom, the head of Latin American Affairs 
inside the State Department. Rubottom was emphatic in the belief that the United States should 
work with the new government of Cuba. 4 
The Central Intelligence Agency, on the other hand, was able to see through the 
revolutionaries' ideals and warned President Eisenhower of Castro's possible ties to Communism. 
Eisenhower wasted little time reacting, imposing an embargo on arms shipments from the United 
States and reducing the quota on Cuban sugar to pressure Castro on the economy. But most 
importandy, experiencing the CIA success in Guatemala during his first term, the President 
authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to increase surveillance on Castro and begin 
planning for the overthrow of Fidel Castro and his government. Eisenhower imposed a 
restriction of "plausible deniability" on the operation allowing the United States to disown such 
an operation for the international community.5 "Plausible deniability" would be a hindrance to 
the CIA throughout the operation as moclern arms (machine guns rather than rifles, for example) 
could not be provided to the brigade out of fear that such materials could be linked to the United 
States: 
The task of overthrowing Castro fell on the shoulders of Richard Bissell, the Deputy 
Director (Plans) for the CIA. lnjanuary of 1960,Jacob Esterline, who was involved in the 1954 
operation in Guatemala, headed a special task force created by Bissell within the Western 
Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency, simply known as WH/4, to coordinate 
Castro's removaJ.6 The CIA's original plan was to coordinate and support the various resistance 
groups inside of Cuba. The Agency had concrete evidence that such an internal uprising would 
be feasible. Although Castro enjoyed a honeymoon with the Cuban people after the fall of 
Batista, his popularity levels dropped quickly when his leftist policies came into effect. Even the 
leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, the predominant religion, deplored Castro's policies and 
his close ties to the Soviet Union. 
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Supporting internal uprisings was not the only option the Central Intelligence Agency 
entertained. The Agency also pursued assassination, albeit reluctantly, as a way to dispose of the 
Cuban leadership. Richard Bissell desired an easy way out and believed Castro could be 
assassinated, therefore allowing the Agency to avoid expending its efforts on a coup.' Plots for 
which the CIA brass had little hope included paying a Cuban a sum of $10,000 to eliminate Fidel 
Castro's brother Raul and poisoning Fidel's cigars with botulism. Both half-hearted attempts 
failed, the former due to the Cuban agent getting cold feet and whether the cigars were even 
delivered in the latter case is unknown, although it would be safe to assume they were not.s 
Despite these poor attempts on Castro's life, one final plan was developed to violently 
remove Fidel Castro from power. In collaboration with the American Mafia, whose casino 
interests in Havana were seized by Castro, the CIA contractedjohn Rosselli, Santos Trafficante, 
and Sam Giancana, members of the Mafia, for $150,000 to neutralize Castro.9 The scheme 
involving the poisoning of Castro's f<XJ<i was ineffective and ended the efforts to neutr.alize Castro 
prior to the military invasion in April 1961. 
In early November 1960, the Deputy Director (Plans) Richard Bissell informed Chief of 
the \\IH/ 4 Special Group Jacob Esterline of the decision to de-emphasize the creation of an 
internal uprising and instead focus on the training and landing of an invasion force consisting of 
Cuban guerrillas. 10 Bissell stated in his post-operation report that the reason for the change in 
plans was because the CIA had believed Castro had solidified his power to the point where 
internal resistance would be quelled in a short period oftime.11 
WH/4 already had a few hundred Cuban exiles training in Panama since March, but the 
training was moved to facilities in Guatemala in July 1960.12 The new Guatemalan camp raised 
eyebrows among those inside the American intelligence community and those of the people in 
Guatemala, many of whom had loyalties to leftists like Fidel Castro. The source of this 
amazement was in the lack of security the facility maintained. The air base was situated on a 
primary road and could be seen from a passenger railroad line.n In addition to the base being 
visible to the general public, the camp had no counter-intelligence division to screen the Cuban 
volunteers. \\!nether or not the Cuban regime was able to place a mole inside the training center 
is unknown, but there is no doubt that the base provided little security since Castro accused the 
United States several times of training guerillas in Guatemala in the months leading up to April 
1961. This is hardly surprising since prominent newspapers in Guatemala and the United States 
were printing articles on the training of Cuban exiles as early as October 1960. H What was 
supposed to be a covert operation was known to the world six months before a single bullet was 
fired at the Bay of Pigs. 
As the training for the exiles was being expedited so they could be used as soon as 
possible, time had run out before the troops could reach a state of readiness to enable President 
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Eisenhower to give the green light on the operation. Vice President Richard Nixon, one of the 
first supporters of overthrowing Castro \\lith military force, was defeated by John F. Kennedy in 
the presidential election in 1960.15 During the campaign, Kennedy lashed out against the 
Eisenhower Administration's apparent lack of concern about the growing threat in Cuba. Based 
on his campaign comments, those inside the intelligence community were confident Kennedy 
would permit the operation to continue. 
Kennedy's comments caused concern among those in the State Department. 
Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned the president-elect that his (Kennedy's) 
statements might be putting Kennedy into corners he could not escape. 16 Before Kennedy took 
office, he spoke with outgoing President Eisenhower who encouraged Kennedy to do whatever it 
took to oust Castro, and recommended the new president to hasten the training of the exiles in 
Guatemala and to recognize a government-in-exileY 
Taking his predecessor's advice, President Kennedy ordered the CIA to establish and 
recognize a government-in-exile that could be installed soon after the invasion. The CIA chose 
the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD-Democratic Revolutionary Front) led by Mir6 
Cordona to be Cuba's provisional government once Castro was removed. With the government 
chosen, American domination on the project created resentment among the Frente's leaders. 
The American contact with the group was unable to speak Spanish, and the CIA controlled all 
the finances, giving the FRD little input in the operation. IS 
Unfortunately for the President, Cuba was getting itself militarily organized to the point 
where action had to be taken immediately in order to remove Castro. Cuba's alliance with the 
Soviet Union was evident as Cuba sent pilots to Czechoslavakia to be trained in Soviet MiG 
fighters. The National Security Agency was able to intercept radio traffic between a Spanish-
speaking pilot and Czech air traffic control as early as january 17. 19 Additionally, the Central 
Intelligence Agency was able to gain knowledge of Cuba making deals to import Soviet artillery 
and Czech antiaircraft guns.zo Such arms shipments were expected to arrive in a matter of 
months. President Kennedy now had to decide whether or not to give the mission the green light 
before Castro could rebuild his military's firepower. 
Besides worrying about Cuba strengthening its dilapidated military, soldiers and civilians 
alike in the Kennedy administration were concerned about the Cuban brigade being trained in 
Guatemala since the previous March. Brigade morale sunk as the Cubans had to endure the 
tropical rain season and because they were prevented from meeting with the leaders of the Frente 
Revolucionario Democnitico.2l The inability to see the FRD leaders angered the soldiers 
because they had every reason to want to know what kind of future they were fighting for in 
Cuba. Finally, the CIA arranged for three FRD representatives to go to Guatemala to meet the 
troops, and the volunteers' spirits rose markedly.22 
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Even if President Kennedy did want to cancel the invasion, he felt that he could not do 
so. The words spoken by Fonner Secretary of State Acheson were beginning to ring true for 
Kennedy. Kennedy believed he had to act on his campaign promises to show the American 
people that he was in fact confronting Castro, Khrushchev, and communism. If the Cuban 
fighters in Guatemala were ordered to disband, Kennedy worried that they would return to 
florida and speak out against the administration in the press. Former Vice President Richard 
Nixon, who was forced to stay quiet on the issue and whose political ambitions were still alive, 
and many other political enemies would surely have pounced on the opportunity to label John F. 
Kennedy as a man with no backbone. Kennedy felt it was better for the Cubans to go and fight 
in Cuba than return to the United States and smear him politically. 
In early l\1arch 1961, President Kennedy was finally informed of how the invasion to 
remove Castro's regime would take place. The Trinidad Plan, taking its name from the town 
where the invasion would take place, heavily borrowed from the Guatemalan operation of 1954. 
Since the May prior to Kennedy's election, the Cubans were being exposed to psychological 
operations from a radio station on Swan Island in the Caribbean Sea off the coast of Honduras, 
with broadcasts similar to those made in Guatemala urging desertion and providing false 
information.23 As for the actual military involvement, the Trinidad Plan called for pre-invasion 
air strikes using old B-26 bombers to destroy the tiny Cuban Air Force and strikes on the day of 
the invasion to wipe out planes that may have survived. \Vith enemy planes eliminated, the 
guerilla force could storm the beachhead near Trinidad under the cover of the bombers. If the 
beachhead could be secured and a government-in-exile be established there, the American 
government could then recognize that government and begin overtly aiding the counter-
revolutionaries with soldiers stationed at the American base at Guant:inamo Bay on stand-by.24 
In addition, the ports at Trinidad were excellent for supply ships to dock, the city was strongly 
anti-Castro, and the nearby Escambray Mountains could allow the invading force to escape in 
the event the invasion did not go as planned.25 
Those in the Central Intelligence Agency were confident that the Trinidad Plan would 
work. Those in the military had the gravest concerns. Colonel Edward Landsdale of the 
Defense Department believed an iovasion would need at least 3,000 men and that the plan's 
"logistics were inadequate. "26 The generals comprising the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not so sure, 
either. A committee led by Brigadier General David Gray estimated a thirty percent chance of 
success and stated that the only way for the Cuban brigade to succeed was if total surprise and air 
superiority were achieved and "substantial popular uprisings or substantial" reinforcements were 
available to assist the invaders. 2i Regardless of Gray's assessment of the Trinidad Plan, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommended that President Kennedy allow the operation to be continued. 
Kennedy was perhaps even more skeptical than the Joint Chiefs. He never had high 
expectations for the mission. He doubted the revolt General Gray believed to be absolutely 
necessary for success was going to materialize after the force had landed on Cuban soil.28 Even 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles said in his personal papers that 
President Kennedy was "only half sold on the necessity of what he was doing, and surrounded by 
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doubting Thomases." These doubters instilled skepticism in Kennedy, but not to the point of 
calling off the invasion. 
Though the invasion was to proceed, the President nixed the Trinidad Plan. Kennedy 
labeled the plan as "too spectacular" and similar to a "World War II invasion."29 In the hopes of 
maintaining "plausible deniability," Kennedy asked for the planners at the CIA to develop an 
alternative to a landing at Trinidad. With Cuba soon receiving arms and freshly trained pilots 
from the Soviet bloc, the planners at the Central Intelligence Agency were forced to develop a 
new plan--and soon. 
Within four days of Trinidad's cancellation, the CIA submitted three new plans for review 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The generals agreed the Bay of Pigs Plan was the best of the three, 
but all believed that its chances for success were not as good as those of the Trinidad Plan, a plan 
that was estimated as having a thirty percent chance for victory. 30 Even the creator of the plan, 
Colonel Jack Hawkins, warned that air strikes had to be carried out and Castro's air force 
eliminated for the Bay of Pigs Plan to succeed.31 
Colonel Hawkins believed that the change from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs was crippling 
since he felt that Trinidad provided all the elements for the invasion to succeed. 32 The Bay of 
Pigs lacked several features which would hinder the invasion force: first, instead of landing on 
soft, sandy beaches found near Trinidad, the counter-revolutionaries would be stepping on sharp 
coral rock; second, the spot did not provide a port like the one at Trinidad for ships to easily dock 
and unload supplies; third, the Bay ofPigs was close to Cienfuegos, a town full of Castro loyalists, 
and the invaders could not expect assistance; fourth, and most importantly, there were no 
mountains to escape to in case the mission failed. 33 Despite all ofthis, Kennedy and Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, especially the latter, stressed the need for "plausible deniability," and the 
supposedly quieter invasion from the Bay of Pigs was to proceed. 
Around the middle of March 1961, the press began to publish major reports on the 
recruitment and military training of Cuban exiles from Miami. Though journalists had written 
on the subject before, none aroused serious interest from the public and their editors. Now, 
though, the Cuban community in Miami was informing reporters that action in Cuba was 
imminent. Reporters for both the New Republic and the New York Tunes had filed stories, but those 
in the White House, including John F. Kennedy himself, requested the stories not be published. 
Both the Republic and Times obliged in the request for the sake of national security.34 Kennedy 
aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., believed that the invasion may have been cancelled had the 
President permitted the news articles to be printed due to the operation's loss of secrecy and 
public outcry against such an act. 35 
If Kennedy had been under the belief that the Cuban brigade was still a secret, he was 
sorely mistaken. If journalists were able to extract information on the invasion from Cubans in 
Miami, it would have been foolhardy to think Castro's agents could not have gathered the same 
intelligence. As a result of receiving excellent intelligence about the imminent invasion and a 
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possible uprising, Castro arrested and imprisoned tens of thousands of suspected members in 
Cuba's counterrevolutionary underground in the weeks leading up to the invasion.36 Castro's 
initiative thwarted any American hopes for a large-scale uprising after the invasion. Also, Castro 
positioned his regular army and militia in multiple areas where he believed an invasion might 
take place, including Trinidad, the Bay of Pigs, and the Isle of Pines outside ofHavanaY 
With the beginning of April, it was apparent that the operation had to be carried out 
within a short period of time. Though President Kennedy was receiving cautious counsel from 
low-level advisors, the Central Intelligence Agency was clamoring for a green light from an 
increasingly reluctant commander-in-chief, even to the point of misleading President Kennedy. 
In a paper dated April 12, the CIA cited seven thousand insurgents in Cuba, but failed to 
differentiate whether the people would take up arms against Castro or if they were just opponents 
with no desire to fight. 38 This was critical because President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were depending on the insurrection of those already in Cuba for the operation's success. 
Despite what the CIA was saying, Joseph Newman, a reporter for the New York Herald 
Tribune, told Kennedy aide Schlesinger that Castro invoked patriotism in the young, and those 
who were anti-Castro would not rise up because they associated America with deposed Fulgencio 
Batista. 39 Furthermore, the CIA told Kennedy that the rebels could turn guerilla if the invasion 
were to fail, and Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell even estimated the chances of success 
at sixty-six percent.40 It is no wonder that Kennedy made his decision based on the information 
he received from his military and intelligence advisors. After the invasion turned into a debacle, 
President Kennedy remarked to his aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that he simply assumed "that the 
military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals."41 
If the President had wanted to cancel the invasion, he did not lack opportunities. First 
and foremost, Kennedy only had to say the word for the invasion to cease. He had reserved the 
right to call it off until twenty-four hours before the invasion. 42 On April 12, only two days 
before final approval was to be given, Georgi Kornienko, a counselor at the Soviet Embassy, 
contacted Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and hinted at the possibility of last minute negotiations with 
Castro. 43 Such a meeting never materialized, but it was a golden opportunity for Kennedy to 
avoid going ahead with the invasion. Also on April 12, President Kennedy confirmed in a press 
conference that U.S. military forces would not be used in any scenario in Cuba.44 By stating this 
Kennedy was unknowingly shooting himself in the foot by not leaving any maneuvering room if 
the impending invasion failed. 
On April 14, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the invasion with the belief that the 
Cuban brigade could retreat to the Escambray Mountains and fight as guerillas.45 Richard 
Bissell of the CIA or one of the generals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have shown Kennedy 
a map of Cuba to show that the guerilla option was not available since the Escambray Mountains 
were eighty miles from the Bay of Pigs .. The scheduled pre-invasion air strikes received a "go," 
36 Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation October 1961, Lyman Kirkpatrick,Jr., ed. Peter Kornbluh, Bf!Y of Pigs 
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but with a critical stipulation. Sixteen B-26 bombers were planned to carry out the mission to 
destroy Castro's air force, but Kennedy believed such a number was too large and ordered the 
number of planes to be halved.46 In the attacks the next day, some of the Cuban planes survived, 
most importantly T -33 jet fighters. 
The uproar the first air strikes caused in the international community was enough for 
Kennedy to make the costliest mistake of the invasion: he canceled the strikes scheduled for 
sunrise on the day of the invasion that were to eliminate the remainder of the Cuban air force.4i 
Kennedy must not have realized the significance of these strikes in that he was sacrificing the 
success of the invasion for the sake of "plausible deniability." Deputy Director of Plans Richard 
Bissell was informed of this decision by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and was given the 
opportunity to speak with Kennedy to persuade him of the crucial importance of those strikes.4ll 
Bissell declined to do so and remnants of the Cuban air force survived. 
The early air strikes that took place were a cause for concern among the generals on the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They believed that the invasion might unnecessarily alert Castro that the 
invasion his army had been preparing to defend against was beginning.49 In response to the 
attacks, instead of ordering his surviving planes to be dispersed, Castro instructed his pilots to be 
ready to fly at all times; while one Cuban pilot stayed vigilant in the cockpit, the co-pilot slept 
under the wing of the plane. 50 
When the Cuban brigade of exiles landed on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs, the invaders 
experienced immediate resistance as a result of Castro positioning his forces in strategic locations 
mentioned earlier.51 However, the first encounters went well as the brigade routed Castro's 
militia, and B-26s strafed the opposing forces with machine guns and bombs. 52 The brigade was 
achieving its mission objectives. 
However, the effects of canceling the second air strikes quickly became apparent. 1be 
ships carrying the supplies were exposed and highly vulnerable from an air assault, and Castro 
knew this. The ship Houston was sunk just after daybreak and the communications ship Rio 
Escondido suffered the same fate only three hours later, each at the hands of Cuban fighter 
planes.53 This forced the remaining two supply ships to stay out to sea, and as a result, the 
invasion ran short on munitions. The B-26s were also affected. Rather than be able to support 
the invasion unmolested, the slow World War II aircraft were easily intercepted and destroyed by 
the faster Cuban T-33 fighters. 54 A total of nine B-26 bombers were downed in support of the 
invading brigade. 55 With ammunition running low and no air cover for protection, the exiles' 
fate was sealed. 
The situation continued to deteriorate for the American-backed fighters on April 18. The 
Cuban militia used artillery and advanced in full force on the brigade on the beaches of the Bay 
of Pigs. Notified of the proceedings, Kennedy reneged on his April 12 promise of no United 
States military personnel involvement and allowed United States Air Force pilots to make flights 
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over Cuba from the Nicaraguan base. 56 On the final day of hostilities, two B-26 bombers were 
shot down and four Americans who flew missions in support of the invasion perished.5i 
American involvement could no longer be denied. 
Events on the island only went from bad to worse for the rebels, as the Cubans unleashed 
air campaigns and made their final push to overrun the brigade on the beaches of the Bay of 
Pigs. Exhausted and demoralized, at 2:00P.M. on April 19, the invading brigade surrendered. 58 
Of the I ,300 members of the brigade, nearly I, 180 were taken prisoner and the remainder of the 
troops were killed in action. 59 Castro flaunted his victory, and President Kennedy was subjected 
to humiliation not only in his own country but throughout the world, as well. 
The Bay of Pigs invasion was an abysmal disaster in every aspect, although through no 
fault of the Cuban exiles. The finger pointing must begin with the Central Intelligence Agency. 
When Eisenhower asked the CIA to undertake this mission, they were to do so covertly. 'When it 
became obvious that the operation was no longer clandestine due to Castro's intelligence or 
published reports on the Guatemalan training camp, the Central Intelligence Agency should 
have recommended the Department of Defense assume control or ceased the operation 
altogether. At the very least, the CIA should have provided the President with unaltered 
information in order to receive a green light. Three costly examples of this misinformation 
should be noted. First, Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell's estimate of success being at 
sixty-six percent was grossly inaccurate. Second, the CIA allowed Kennedy to continue to 
believe that in the event of failure, the brigade could retreat to the Escambray Mountains and 
fight a guerilla war. Unfortunately, these mountains were eighty miles from the Bay of Pigs. 
Third, and most importantly, the planners did not stress the importance of the air strikes to the 
success of the mission. All damage inflicted on the brigade resulted from the T-33 jet fighters, 
and a post-invasion report believed that had the invaders received more air cover and 
ammunition, the Cuban exiles could have at least prevented an embarrassing rout.60 Had the 
Cuban Air Force been destroyed and the brigade had been able to possess air superiority, the B-
26 bombers could have easily supported the landing forces by strafmg the Cuban positions at 
will. 
For all the grave errors the Central Intelligence Agency made, President Kennedy, as 
commander-in-chief, should bear the brunt of the blame. He never intended to fully support this 
operation, and his adamant stance on "plausible deniability" cost the invasion its success by 
Kennedy refusing to meet the needs of the brigade so that his political backside would be 
covered. He ordered a new, quieter plan to be used rather than one that had better chances of 
success. He also wanted the Cuban brigade returned to their homeland so that they could not 
come to .Miami and tell the American press of Kennedy's failure to stand up to Castro and 
Communism. The critical error was limiting the air strikes two days before the invasion and then 
canceling the air strikes altogether on the day of the invasion. Another key error made by 
President Kennedy that was crucial to his decision was that he believed that the brigade could 
escape into the mountains and fight a guerrilla war. Kennedy should have looked at a map of 
Cuba and seen 'With his own eyes that the guerrilla option was not available since the mountains 
were eighty miles away. 
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The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs could have been avoided had the planning been better and 
had the President been better informed. President Kennedy's first major foray in foreign policy 
was a costly one, as Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union blossomed to the point of allowing 
Soviet nuclear missiles to be based in Cuba a year and a half after the invasion. A deceptive 
intelligence agency and a doubtful commander-in-chief permitted the Bay of Pigs invasion to be 
a mistake that should never have been. 
